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Afghanistan: Alternative
Futures and Their
Implications
Naveed Mukhtar

T

he future is a combination of what “will be” and what “can be.” What “will
be” is brought about by factors and events outside the control and influence
of strategic leaders. For instance, natural disasters and even many social trends are
immune to external controls and management. Strategic leaders, however, have
the ability to generate positive future outcomes by influencing what “can be.”
Perhaps no single country exercises more influence over the factors that
sway what “can be” than the actions of the United States. Its preeminent influence extends across every global domain (economic, social, political, military,
and cultural), and into virtually every developed country of the world. As the
sole superpower, its major foreign and domestic policy decisions affect the world.
However, the world order consists of a complex, adaptive, and open system
that complicates and often obviates US strategies designed to achieve positive
outcomes. Cause-and-effect estimates of foreign policy activities fuel many
unpredictable responses with second- and third-order effects that can literally
overwhelm the anticipated first-order response. This is further complicated by
time delays in reactions, counterreactions, and counter-counterreactions, that
may camouflage or obscure the long-term negative consequences of an apparent
short-term positive response to an implemented strategy. This is especially true
during periods of armed conflict where uncertainty, volatility, and ambiguity are
dramatically increased, and fear and friction obscure even transparent policy
intentions. The development and analysis of alternative future scenarios is one way
of providing a means for identifying and examining numerous factors relevant in
formulating or modifying effective goals and strategies. This article examines the
context of the current conflict in Afghanistan, assesses the interests and activities
of major stakeholders in a regional and global context, and advances alternative
scenarios for the future. These scenarios serve to highlight possible outcomes and
the governing factors currently impacting the US Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak)
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strategy. By identifying possible alternative scenarios, policy makers can improve
upon strategies designed to achieve the desired strategic outcome.

Existing Environment in Afghanistan
Immediately following the appalling 11 September 2001 attacks, the
United States initiated a campaign in Afghanistan aimed at eliminating the
al Qaeda extremists who planned and conducted the attack and replacing the
Taliban government that provided a sanctuary for al Qaeda activities.1 After
almost 10 years, the Afghan War is becoming increasingly unpopular with
the American public and is losing political support in the United States and
the international community.2 Responding to a deteriorating strategic environment in Afghanistan and a growing US public opposition to the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, President Obama announced a “surge” and “exit plan”
for Afghanistan.3 The new strategy creates conditions for an acceptable transition; implements a civilian surge that institutes positive civic reforms; and helps
to shape an effective partnership with Pakistan in an effort to defeat insurgent
forces operating in the Afghan-Pakistan border areas.4
Since the decision to increase the number of US military forces and to
improve civil-support activities, there have been numerous accomplishments:
an increase in the training and education of Afghan security forces, additional
funding for internal development projects, and, most importantly, wresting
major areas from Taliban control.5 Still, many daunting challenges remain,
including mollifying the competing interests of major external stakeholders.
Amplifying the competing and disparate interests between stakeholders is the fear of the abandonment of Afghanistan by the United States and
the diminished prospect of transition to a capable Afghan government. Many
of the players involved believe that the final American withdrawal is already
well underway and will continue regardless of the strategic conditions in
Afghanistan.6 A major concern is the fact that the Afghans do not appear ready
to assume security and governance responsibilities7 with the central government rife with corruption and mismanagement.8

The Tragedy of Afghanistan
Intervention by the United States in Afghanistan is remarkably similar to
previous military campaigns into this remote and inhospitable region.9 Despite
the substantial US involvement in supporting the Afghan insurgency against the
Soviets, few American policy makers appreciated the geographic, social, and
cultural complexities of Afghanistan. The policy makers had to relearn hard
lessons, the most important of which was that building a central government and
associated security structure in a splintered, tribal-centric society is substantially more difficult than overthrowing an existing government.10 The ascent of
the Taliban and revival of the insurgency following the initial American victory
was cataclysmic. Even more tragic, however, is the fact that many military commanders and policy makers knew the scope of these strategic challenges but
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failed to convince America’s leadership of the gravity of the potential risks and
the extent of resources required to ensure long-term success.11
Failure to establish an effective government following the removal
of the Taliban established conditions for increased violence and insurgency.
Governance at the local, provincial, and national levels was always weak and
ineffectual. Resources were both inadequate and mismanaged with many rural
areas experiencing no improvements in services such as electricity and water.12
Additionally, there was a major absence of manpower capable of providing security and establishing conditions for effective decentralized governance capable
of countering the growth of any insurgency. Notably, the ratio of international
forces to the host nation population was below that of every nation-building
intervention since World War II. By 2003, operations in Iraq consumed most
of the international communities’ financial priority and allowed the fragile
internal stability of Afghanistan to continue to deteriorate. The overwhelming
initial strategic success against the Taliban was squandered as growing corruption, ineffectual governance, and the absence of security forces permitted the
Taliban to regain the initiative.13

Stakeholders and Their Interests
Afghanistan’s six immediate neighbors (China, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) and its regional partners (Russia, India, and
Saudi Arabia) all have a stake in Afghanistan’s future when the United States
withdraws. Of these bordering actors, Pakistan likely exercises the most influence over the strategic outcome primarily due to its role in combating extremists
along the border and its influence with the Pashtuns14 (the largest and most
influential ethnic group in Afghanistan).15 It is the United States and the West,
however, that currently exercise the greatest influence over the finances, military
power, and other governance and economic reform efforts that will eventually
dictate strategic success or failure. It is increasingly apparent that America and
its allies need to rely on Afghanistan’s neighbors to avoid derailing the progress already made, and ideally, they will continue to support these programs
when the United States withdraws. Such strategy requires a deliberate effort to
resolve regional issues that may preclude effective cooperation between major
players. As General David Petraeus noted, “It’s not possible to resolve the challenges internal to Afghanistan without addressing the challenges, especially in
terms of security, related to Afghanistan’s neighbors.”16 The important question
is: “Do these key states see their own interests with regards to counterterrorism, governance in Afghanistan, and longer term reconstruction and economic
development in such a way that a working consensus among them could be
forged?”17 These external stakeholders’ influences and possible interventions
could be crucial in achieving long- term stability and prosperity in Afghanistan.
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Competing and Converging Interests
There are coincident interests and substantial disparities among the
parties with vested interest in Afghanistan.18 To integrate Afghanistan’s neighbors collectively or individually into a single regional strategy will require a
major effort to assuage enmities and reinforce commonalities of interests.19
Although many of the parties support the objectives of stability and prosperity
for Afghanistan, they differ significantly on how best to achieve those objectives.20 Clearly, not every stakeholder can be accommodated and its interests
satisfied. A viable strategy needs to attract and incorporate those parties that
have the means, opportunity, and strength of coincident interests to achieve
strategic objectives for Afghanistan and the region while at the same time minimizing the influence of opposing parties. Some experts believe that substantial
differences between the regional actors on internal Afghan issues actually
preclude cooperation and obviate a regional strategy.21 Notwithstanding this
dichotomy, the United States and its allies will continue to pursue a strategy
evoking positive and negative responses by regional actors and internal factions
with regard to Afghanistan.

Internal Dynamics
Pivotal internal actors having a direct influence on the future of Afghanistan are: the present Afghan government, the Taliban,22 the Northern Alliance,23
and other insurgent factions and war lords. Factionalism, credible governance,
Afghan social dynamics, and drug production and export, all influence these
internal actors and their interrelationships.
Since the overthrow of the Taliban by the Northern Alliance, the Karzai
government and the United States, together with their allies, have been engaged
primarily in a civil war over the distribution of power. Actual combat is being
conducted against a loose knit set of insurgent groups formed and fighting along
ethnic lines, rural against urban factions, and over religious sectarian differences.24 The increase in insurgent activity is occurring against the backdrop of a
substantial increase in the number of coalition and American forces combating
these elements throughout Afghanistan.25 Statistically there has been a 40 percent
increase in attacks by insurgents in each of the last four years.26 Combat and
noncombat casualties have increased and so has the intimidation of civilians and
tribal elders associated with government and nongovernmental organizations.27
Correspondingly, most Afghanis do not support or sympathize with the
Taliban as they see them as the cause of many of their problems and hardships.
They also believe that the Taliban’s presence attracts military operations that
generate secondary destruction and casualties, as well as hindering needed
development projects.28
Although the insurgents are not particularly popular, they are usually
favored over what is viewed as a corrupt and ineffective Afghan government.
The insurgent’s motivation and source of limited popular support is largely due
to the belief that the Afghan government is corrupt and abuses its power, the
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perception of the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan by foreign forces,
and a perceived threat to Afghan and Islamic values and culture. The social and
economic deprivations experienced by major sectors of the populace also play
an important role in support for the insurgents.29 As with most insurgencies, the
population is the center of gravity in this complex strategic environment and
there is continued competition by all parties to secure support and confidence.30

Stabilizing the Mosaic
The strategic solution may be inextricably linked to the problem—
Afghanistan is a mosaic of ethnic, religious, and tribal factions all with internal
and external sources of support.31 Together, the mosaic “pieces” compose an
image of what we call Afghanistan. The mosaic, however, is only loosely
bound by a weak central government. It is primarily held together by the fragile
balance and interrelationships between each “piece” and the association of that
piece to external regional stakeholders. Any effort to strengthen the role and
influence of the central government or any one of the factions will create a bias
threatening the entire mosaic. Significant disruption of the mosaic would be
resisted by internal forces and likely provoke one or more external players to
covertly or overtly intervene.32 An effective regional strategy would be one that
moves to stabilize the internal mosaic, not remake it or disrupt the precarious
balance between each of the internal pieces and the external stakeholders.
Power sharing between the centralized government and the multitude of
internal factions is not just an expedient, it is an imperative.33 A viable regional
strategy would recognize the legitimacy of each of the factions and would
resource, stabilize, and moderate the corresponding local governance structures while preventing hegemonic imbalances. The strategy should empower
the Afghan central government to enable a decentralized governance through
the provision of resources to each of the internal entities in exchange for moderation and cooperation. This would require an impartial and relatively weak
central government but one with “deep pockets” that is willing to govern indirectly. Once the mosaic is stabilized, the central government could gradually
increase its credibility and evolve into a more effective and authoritative role.
How the resultant regional and internal dynamics unfold will depend
upon the actions of the Afghan government, the United States and their allies,
along with the other regional and internal powers. To this end, a scenario-based
analysis can aid in surfacing factors that can inform strategic planning.

Scenarios
Scenarios are not predictions nor are they assured consequences of one
or more potential strategies. The following scenarios are narratives of alternative future environments that manifest plausible developments by combining
underlying influences and trends. The scenarios highlight the risks and opportunities of possible future events driven by alternative engagement activities
and the likely responses of the relevant stakeholders within the postulated
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environment.34 Four scenarios, each framed by two fundamental and related
conditions, are detailed. Each scenario contains a brief projection of the operational and strategic environment, identifies scenario goals, and describes a way
forward. The scenarios combine factors and trends in a cohesive and holistic
manner to illuminate the underlying assumptions and other dynamics impacting the development of effective strategies.35 Figure 1 provides the conceptual
framework for the four scenarios.

Figure 1. Scenario Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework portrays two major variables: the vertical
axis depicts the level of governance (either strong central governance or a more
traditional Afghan decentralized governance approach). The horizontal axis
portrays the level of stability: a relatively stable social/political environment
limited to individual random acts of violence and, at the other extreme, an unstable political and security environment with an active insurgency/civil war. Each
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quadrant uses a pairing of those four states to frame a scenario, examine possible
strategic intervention measures and explore potential strategic outcomes.

Fumbled Hand-Off
A Moderate Taliban Takeover. America and its allies continue training
Afghan security forces and transition responsibilities to the Afghans. Apparent
operational successes against extremist Taliban and eventual negotiated agreements with moderate insurgent groups allow for an orderly withdrawal of
US and Allied forces. Following the US withdrawal, the Afghan government
extends governance responsibilities to the Taliban at the local, district, and
provincial levels in an effort to assuage possible resurgent threats. Renascent
corruption and incompetence in the Karzai government erodes the central
government’s credibility and creates the conditions for a resurgent, though
moderate, Taliban. Taliban influence grows from district to province and finally
results in the Taliban’s seizure of the central government. The moderate Taliban
shape a coalition with major ethnic groups to form a strong and viable central
government. The Taliban government expels remaining al Qaeda elements
from the country and provides guarantees to the West that terrorism will not be
exported. Sharia law is implemented from the central government and results in
the elimination of drug production, infringes on the rights of women, and limits
economic growth. The absence of the terrorist threat to the West and an overall
lack of political will or popular support precludes the United States and its allies
from reentering Afghanistan. Iran, India, and the Central Asian Republics are
dissuaded from interfering in Afghan internal affairs by assurances from the
Taliban government that it will not export terrorism nor tolerate al Qaeda within
its borders. Regional actors begin to engage the moderate Taliban government
and open diplomatic and economic ties. Afghanistan limps toward economic
growth with external countries exploiting newly discovered mineral deposits
and opening trade routes to Central Asia. Although Afghanistan is stable, there
continues to be some internal resistance and limited acts of violence against the
Taliban’s harsh domestic policies and international criticism of the infringement on women and human rights.
Goals and Way Forward. From the US and international perspective, a
moderate Taliban takeover is a marginally acceptable outcome. In this scenario,
Afghanistan hovers on the brink of becoming a failed state with the real danger
that it might once again become a source of terrorist activities. The primary
US goal would be to ensure that al Qaeda does not return and that Afghanistan
does not become a source of terrorist attacks outside its borders. The United
States should engage the Taliban with the help of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to
ensure that Afghanistan does not return to a pre-2001 state. At the same time,
America should encourage the Afghan government to incorporate major ethnic
and political groups into its central government. This will provide an effective
counterbalance to a resurgent extremist Taliban rule. The United States should
use a concerted carrot and stick approach with the Taliban to dissuade the
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export of terrorism as well as threaten use of precision strikes should al Qaeda
or other terrorists seek refuge or receive support from the Taliban government.
The United States would continue to seek assistance from Afghanistan’s neighbors to stop any meddling in Afghan internal affairs and to help deny cross
border safe havens for insurgent or terrorist organizations.

The Whole Nine Yards
Central Government Agrees to Decentralize Power and Accommodate
Moderate Taliban at District and Provincial Levels. As in the previous scenario,
the United States and its allies make an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The US, NATO, and Afghan government make a deliberate effort to integrate
moderate Taliban elements into selected local governments before departure,
while overseeing the decentralization and power sharing by the central government. The United States assists the central government in establishing governing
structures at the provincial, district, and local levels with adequate resources,
funding for the construction of facilities, and effective security forces. The
government in Kabul establishes and retains a military capability to eliminate
any subversive threats to the central government. Sharia law is practiced and
enforced at various local levels but is primarily limited to the remote areas of
the country. These Sharia enclaves will eventually be pressured to moderate
their control due to negative local sentiment and pressure from human rights
groups. The present government, Taliban, Northern Alliance, and other major
actors agree on power sharing, an equitable distribution of revenues, and on
measures ensuring peace and stability. All these groups find common ground
in opposing external regional influences or interference. Due to these positive
developments, peace is restored in most of the country. This environment paves
the way for heavy investment by donor countries, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The absence of a foreign presence, economic progress, and effective local governance defuse the underlying causes
of the insurgency and Afghanistan muddles toward stability and economic
prosperity, slowly overcoming the deleterious effect of political corruption and
its fractured, decentralized governance.
Goals and Way Forward. The involvement of the Taliban in a decentralized government scenario will cause some uncertainty within the United States
and with other interested parties. This scenario, however, provides a much
greater chance for stability in Afghanistan because the transition and accommodation of the moderate Taliban occur while the United States is in a position
to positively influence and shape the transition. The goal would be to remain
closely involved and engaged in this critical and sensitive effort. America would
also need to continue with financial aid and military assistance to enable the efficient establishment of local governance. Working with the Afghan government,
the United States should engage Afghanistan’s neighbors and encourage them
to maintain positive relations, rather than interfering in Afghan internal affairs.
America should assist the Afghan military in conducting limited operations
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against any remaining al Qaeda elements within the country while enhancing
military cooperation with an emphasis on training and military exchanges. The
main focus for the United States, along with the government of Afghanistan,
would be to ensure a credible though limited central government that shares
power with the local, district, and regional entities.

Decline into Chaos
Anarchy Reigns. The United States and its allies conduct an abrupt
departure, leaving behind a weak government facing latent insurgency that is
simply waiting for the United States to withdraw.36 The Afghanistan government fails to ensure security, stability, and the provision of services due to
widespread corruption, infighting, and weak national security forces. There is
no consensus government and the militias and warlords rapidly gain strength
while assuming responsibility for the maintenance of order and exercise of
governance. The Afghan government, the Taliban, and a regrouped Northern
Alliance engage in combat for control of Kabul. Fighting spreads to most parts
of Afghanistan as the insurgents strive to institute local governance against
a corrupt and ineffectual central authority. The tribal, ethnic, and sectarian
insurgents cause the division of Afghanistan into zones controlled by distinct
groups, many affiliated with various regional actors. Neighboring countries
exercise influence in areas inside Afghanistan to support proxy insurgents,
secure their respective groups, and safeguard their interests. In addition,
regional stakeholders buy influence by providing financial aid, weapons, and
supplies to selected tribal chiefs or factions. These factions vie for power
while seeking retribution for current and past transgressions. The Taliban
renew their offensive and are able to establish control in Eastern and Southern
parts of Afghanistan, to include Kabul. The remainder of the country (Western
and Northern parts of Afghanistan) comes under the control of various Tajik,
Uzbek, and Hazara tribes. Tension grows and persists as regional antagonists
react to provocative responses and assorted interventions from outside the
country. Afghan security forces begin to collapse and desert as funding and
training suffer due to continued conflict, the diversion of resources by corrupt
officials, and the recruitment of security personnel by warring ethnic, tribal,
and sectarian factions. Anarchy reins as refugees pour into the neighboring
countries of Iran, the Central Asian Republics, and Pakistan. Western nations
lack the political will to redeploy combat forces into Afghanistan although
neighboring countries do conduct limited cross-border forays into Afghanistan
to protect their respective ethnic and tribal groups or pursue criminals and
combatants. The United Nations conducts humanitarian relief operations to
help assuage suffering, but does not commit to peacekeeping or peacemaking
operations. Afghanistan devolves into a failed and largely ungoverned state
with established enclaves of tribal, ethnic, and sectarian governed areas. Al
Qaeda reestablishes terrorist training camps within the country and the United
States conducts periodic strike operations against selected terrorist targets using

70Parameters

Afghanistan: Alternative Futures and Their Implications

global strike capabilities, violating Afghan sovereignty and further alienating
many Muslim countries.
Goals and Way Forward. A “decline into chaos” is the most dangerous
scenario. The US goals would be to engage all the major players, contain the conflict within the borders of Afghanistan, avoid an all-out regional war, and prevent
any terrorist attacks from being coordinated or launched from Afghanistan.
America would have to make aggressive diplomatic efforts to dissuade provocative action or intervention by regional players. Adverse public opinion would
prevent a return of US ground forces into Afghanistan, although the public would
likely tolerate American military supplies or financial support for a multinational
or United Nations response. The regional actors and the United Sates would
likely have to wait for the conflict to run its course before directly intervening in
Afghanistan. The potential human suffering would be profound.

Dead Man Walking
The Karzai Government Fights On. The United States and its allies
withdraw leaving an active but weakened insurgency and a viable but limited
Afghan security force capability. In this scenario, the Karzai government
maintains control of Kabul and several provinces but it is unable to establish decentralized governance structures at the local, district, and provincial
levels in a number of contested areas due to a lack of resources and an active
resistance. Consequently, the Karzai government continues to fight insurgent
elements with available Afghan security forces and is able to maintain its power
in Kabul and in other selected regions. The central government is unable to
make substantial progress either in combating the insurgency or in extending
its governance. Afghanistan settles into an active civil war with major areas of
the country ungoverned, causing the nation to teeter on becoming a failed state.
A general Afghan campaign against all Taliban serves to further radicalize
even the moderate Taliban factions. Consequently, the rural areas come under
the increasing control of radical Taliban which in turn threatens a return of
an extremist Taliban takeover and a safe haven for al Qaeda. The absence of
a clear and present terrorist threat to the United States coupled with a lack of
political will prevents America from redeploying combat forces to Afghanistan.
Additionally, the return of rampant corruption within the central government
coupled with a poor security environment dissuades foreign investment and
economic support from the international community. Drug production and the
associated illicit trade continue to rise, while the social and security environments decline incrementally. Regional stakeholders and neighbors respond
with covert and, in some instances, overt support to their respective factions
within Afghanistan, while vieing for hegemony and influence in the deteriorating internal political environment.
Goals and Way Forward. The “dead man walking” scenario depicts
a degraded strategic and operational environment. The US goal would be to
isolate Afghan conflict and limit any negative impact on the region while

Summer 2011

71

Naveed Mukhtar

preventing al Qaeda from establishing safe havens and training camps within
Afghanistan. Although the United States would unlikely send ground forces
into the country, it could conduct covert global strikes against suspected al
Qaeda camps. The fragile Afghan security environment would be closely
monitored but the United States would probably limit its strategic liability
and allow the Afghans to determine their own future, while letting regional
actors take whatever measures are deemed necessary to arrest the deteriorating
Afghan social, political, and security environments.

Conclusions and Recommendations
Generally, developing cohesive and effective strategic concepts are
“wicked problems” that are not amenable to simple cause-and-effect analyses.
Developing illustrative scenarios that holistically describe possible events and
the interactions of the major stakeholders helps to visualize alternative futures
and, thereby, educate strategic leaders. The four scenarios described reflect both
positive and negative futures for Afghanistan while illuminating some critical
considerations. Five major themes or issues emerge from these scenarios:
1. The involvement and importance of external stakeholders.
2. The effectiveness of the Afghan government.
3. The capabilities of Afghani security forces.
4. The extent of ethnic divisions and the strength of the Taliban and other
insurgent groups.
5. The will, interest, and influence of the United States.
A major characteristic of all the scenarios is the prevention of the return of al
Qaeda to Afghanistan, while ensuring terrorism can no longer be exported
outside of its borders.
Importantly, all four scenarios postulate that the US withdrawal will
result in some negative consequences for Afghanistan. It is also increasingly evident that once the US and allied combat forces are withdrawn from
Afghanistan, it will be difficult to support their return—under any circumstance
short of another 9/11-like attack. The United States needs to be extremely cognizant of any decisions or actions required to position the Afghan government
for success following the US departure.
Three major aspects of the scenarios govern the prospect for positive
outcomes. First, viable decentralized governance structures at the local, district, and provincial levels need to be established. Second, moderate Taliban
factions must be accommodated as part of that governance structure, especially
in select areas where they have a strong influence. Third, the aforementioned
aspects need to be accomplished before the United States’ withdrawal is complete. Quite simply, decentralized governance is ingrained in the culture and
traditions of the Afghan society,37 as is the respect and referent authority of
the Taliban in various parts of the country.38 Neither can be replaced with a
central authority from Kabul without risking the continuation of an insurgency
with potentially disastrous consequences. To effect the transition to a decentralized, power-sharing structure with the moderate Taliban incorporated,
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the United States needs to initiate and for the most part finish any such effort
before withdrawal. To believe that a nascent Afghan security force could
exercise the necessary degree of control to transition to local governance over
radical Taliban insurgents in the regions where the insurgents are entrenched is
nothing short of sheer folly. The challenge lies with overcoming what is likely
to be a mediocre Afghan security force that is perceived to be supported by an
illegitimate and corrupt central government.
Additionally, the United States needs to remain constructively engaged
with all stakeholders, while adopting a firm approach that dissuades regional
actors from taking provocative actions to intervene in Afghanistan’s internal affairs during or after the US withdrawal. The cooperation of all major
players should be solicited in an effort to work toward a stable and prosperous
Afghanistan, an objective that is in the best interests of all parties. The United
States should continue with financial and military assistance and encourage
international institutions and donors to provide additional investments. At the
same time, America needs to remain engaged with moderate Taliban leaders
and encourage them to eschew any relationship with al Qaeda. Lastly, the United
States policy makers need to think through the possible consequences of a precipitous withdrawal and its impact on both Afghanistan and the region, while
preparing possible strategies that would include a plan to marshal and sustain
the necessary public and political support to implement the various options.
Most strategies inherently assume a positive outcome and are generally based upon optimistic assumptions without regard to resourcing and
the anticipated responses of various stakeholders. No strategist deliberately
designs a strategy to fail. Although the scenarios articulated here are intended
to be illustrative and not predictive, they do serve to highlight possible strategic
actions with the potential for negative consequences. More importantly, they
highlight significant challenges faced by the Afghanistan that is left behind.
Those dangers dictate that the current strategy needs to focus on more than
simply improving the current Afghanistan environment in an attempt to
facilitate or hasten an American departure. Rather, there is a critical need for
a strategy devoted to the long-term security and prosperity for Afghanistan
and the region.39 Establishing a viable context for Afghan stability and security
involves key regional and global stakeholders. Towards that end, the United
States needs to employ major diplomatic measures designed to ease regional
tensions and prevent external players from derailing the strategy. Only through
a resolute US commitment to long-term stability in Afghanistan and with the
cooperation of key regional and global stakeholders, peace, prosperity, and
stability can be nurtured in this volatile part of the world.
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